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T h i s  s t u d y  e x a m i n e s  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  l e a d -  
i n g  C a n a d i a n  f i l m  p r o d u c e r s  who h a v e  a t t e m p t e d  t o  p r o f i t  
f r o m  t h e  A m e r i c a n  t h e a t r i c a l  a n d  a n c i l l a r y  m a r k e t s .  I t  a l s o  
a n a l y z e s  A m e r i c a n  f i l m  t r a n s n a t i o n a l s 1  p o l i c i e s  o f  p r o d u c -  
t i o n  a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  g l o b a l l y  a n d  a r g u e s  t h a t  C a n a d a ' s  f i l m  
p o l i c y  b a s e d  o n  m a r k e t  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  may n o t  
s e r v e  i t s  l o n g  t e r m  i n t e r e s t  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  a  n a t i o n a l  f i l m  
i n d u s t r y .  
Cette etude t r a i t e  l e e  stratggies  e t  l e s  experiences des 
principaux metteurs en scene canadiens qui ont essay6 de 
prof i t e r  des marches th66traux e t  anc i l la ires  americaina 
Elle  analyse aussi lee  moyens e t  buts de production e t  de 
distribution du f i lm amiricain globalement, e t  demontre qu' 
il se peut que la politique du film canadienne, qui eat  
basde eur son entree au max-chb dee Etats-Unis ,ne serve pas 
son but A long terme de divelopper une industrie cin8mato- 
graphique nationale. 
Film has been an early and fundamental stratum in the multi- 
layered "free" flow of information which includes wire services, books, 
magazines, radio and television programs, and teleprocessing of data 
from the advanced industrialized countries to the countries of the 
periphery. The American film industry has been a pioneer in setting 
the pattern for the one way flow of cultural goods from the United 
States to its dependencies (Schiller, 1969; Tunstall, 1977). The 
American film producer-distributor canbines have also set the pattern 
for exporting abroad the know-how, through their subsidiaries and 
investments, to produce imitations of the products they export as parts 
of the structure of domination (Guback. 1969). 
Canada finds itself, in the case of its cultural industries, as a 
part of the periphery thereby, sharing that experience with the new 
nations of  Africa, Asia and Latin America. Canada's feature film 
market was invaded and occupied by the expansionist American film 
industry as early as 1915 and has remained in its captivity ever since 
(Pendakur , 1980). The branch plant film distribution system, which has 
operated in Canada for well over a half century, has been shown to have 
precluded the development of a Canadian feature film industry (Penda- 
kur, 1980; CFDC Annual Report, 1981-82, 5). Until the filmmakers, 
independent distributors, independent theatre owners pressured the 
Canadian government in the 1960's to intervene in Canada's film market 
to restructure it favoring Canadian participation, Canada did not have 
any significant film production of its own. American branch plant 
production had occurred sporadically. What the Government of Canada 
chose was not to alter the market relations which were known to be 
detrimental to Canadian capital and cultural experession but to stimu- 
late production at home. That has been the basic policy framek~rk on 
which a superstructure of cultural institutions have been built includ- 
ing the Canadian Film Development Corporation (CFDC). The Canadian 
Film Development Corporation has operated like a bank to aid Canadian 
film makers who could not find the venture capital for film production. 
The Capital Cost Allowance Program (CCA), introduced in 1975 to further 
assist film production by allowing investors to deduct 100 percent of 
their investment in film against their income taxes, is also an expres- 
sion of such a policy frame work (Lyon and Trebilock, n .d .) . From 1954 
to 1974, the Capital Cost Allowance Program was set at sixty per cent 
mostly in consideration of short films and travellogues since very few 
feature films were being produced in Canada. It was increased to one 
hundred per cent in 1975. Criticism of the government's lack of con- 
cern for a certain degree of "Canadian" content gave rise to a point 
system in 1976 to which all applications are subjected. In the wake of 
the Canadian Film Development Corporation and Capital Cost A1 lowance 
Program, Canadian film makers have produced many films. American 
branch plant production has also taken place thereby over-laying a 
branch plant production sector on the already existing branch plant 
distribution and exhibition sector. 
While national policies have stimulated film production, profit- 
ability for films produced in Canada appears elusive. Between 1968 - 
1978, the Canadian Film Development Corporation invested nearly twenty- 
six million dollars in some two hundred and twenty films with budgets 
totalling sixty million dollars. While the Candian Film Development 
Corporation recovered only five million dollars, it is not known if any 
of the private investors recouped their principal and received any 
prof its from the release of those pictures (CFDC, Reports, 1978 - 1979; 
Report of the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee, 1982, 254). A 
great many films have been made since the Capital Cost Allowance 
Program was introduced with bigger budgets ranging around four to six 
million dollars and some of those films h a w  teen shown in the U. S. 
theatrical and ancillary markets as well. But no analysis has been 
done on their profitability to Canadian film makers and investors. 
Canada's policies in the film industry are not merely economic 
instrumentalities. They have to serve a cultural purpose also which 
has been articulated in many Royal Commission Reports (Royal Commission 
on Broadcasting, 1929; Royal Commission on National Development in the 
Arts, Letters and Sciences, 1965; Special Senate Committee on Mass 
Media, 1970). The institutions such as the National Film Board of 
Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and the Canadian Film 
Development Corporation are also mandated by the Parliament of Canada 
to define, enhance, and support Canadian identity and cultural expres- 
sion to counter American cultural hegemony in Canada. 
This study is not concerned with the question of what cultural 
purpose do films produced under the current national policy serve, 
important as that may be. The study is primarily concerned with exam- 
ining the economic relations that exist between major Canadian film 
producers (who have made films with the intention of profiting from the 
U.S. and other foreign markets) and American distributors. 
The study also attempts to analyze how these Canadian film makers 
are coping with the changes occurring in the entertainment industry in 
the United States brought on by the introduction of new delivery sys- 
tems such as cable, pay-television, and shrinking tax shelter moneies 
at home. As Andre Lamy, executive director of the Canadian Film De- 
velopment Corporation explained the adverse conditions faced by Cana- 
dian producers recently: 
It was no easy task for the Canadian producer to grab hold 
of the distribution industry -- only the Americans control 
their own theatrical distribution. For the Canadian 
producer or director, it was a hell of a game to make sure 
that there would be some money back from theatrical release. 
(Adilman, 1983, 1, 51). 
This study assesses in some detail what Lamy called a "hell of a game" 
that the Canadian producers are playing to secure a position for them- 
selves in the United States entertainmetit industry. It analyzes cer- 
tain strategies pursued by the major Canadian film producers in dealing 
with American distributors. It also examines the patterns of U.S. 
distribctors' policies of global production, and release of their own 
pictures and the pictures they acquire around the world and discusses 
their imp1 ications for Canada's current film pol icy. 
METHOD 
Extended interviews were conducted with a selected number of 
Canadian film producers to gather the necessary data for this study. 
Eight producer groups and their ten films marketed in the United States 
were identified as the study sample. They are listed in Table One. 
The rationale for choosing them is explained in this section. 
Canadian Producers 
Before analyzing the distribution deals of a selected number of 
films produced by major Canadian film producers, let us consider each 
of the producers briefly. The study sample consisted of ten feature 
films which were produced by eight producer groups, whose names and 
film titles are listed in Table One. These films were selected for the 
following reasons: (1) They had all found entry into the U.S. theatri- 
cal market; (2) They were all produced in Canada either under the tax 
shelter and/or with financial support from the Canadian Film Develop- 
ment Corporation. (3) These films, in our view, are typical of the 
films that Canadians have been producing with the aim of profiting from 
the U.S. and international markets. These films fall into the general 
categories of horror (Terror Train), college comedy (Meatballs), and 
art film (Atlantic City) genres. Although the sample of films is 
small, it represents fairly well the kinds of films Canada is producing 
for global audiences. 
The producers of these films are called major Canadian film produ- 
cers in this study for a nunber of reasons. Some of these persons have 
built long lasting enterprises which have regularly supplied film 
products. Consider for instance, John Dunning and Andre Link of Cine- 
pix in Montreal. They have been producing films since 1968 and have 
built their own independent distribution networks in Canada. They have 
also been important in the sense of creating opportunities for home- 
grown talent such as Ivan Reitman, David Cronenberg, etc. Harold 
Greenberg's Astral Films is another company that has had an on-going 
film production activity in Canada. Its operations include a film 
distribution company with branches across Canada, film processing and 
retailing of photographic products in a national chain of outlets. 
Dunning and Greenberg, who were interviewed for the study have done 
films in French and English, the two national languages of Canada. 
Garth Drabinsky, another producer in this study has not only been a 
prominent English language film producer with six films to his credit 
but has slowly built a vertial ly integrated enterprise of production 
(Tiberius Productions, Ltd.), distribution (PanCanadian Films 1, and 
exhibition (Cineplex Corporation) in Canada. His seventeen multiple 
screen auditoriums housing approximately two hundred screens are repre- 
sented in every key Canadian city and also in Los Angeles, California. 
Denis Heroux has produced nearly twenty-six films since 1965 and is 
well known for his abilities to put together international coproduc- 
tion~. Don Goldberg has written two major films for Colunbia Pictures 
(Stripes, and Space Hunter). He has also coproduced Meatballs, which 
was a summer hit in the United States and Canadian markets. The produ- 
cers interviewed for the study thus represent a dynamic group of 
businessmen who, in many ways, form the backbone of commercial cinema 
in Canada. 
Major Canadian Film Producers Interviewed for the Study 
Producer 
Film Date of Chicago 
Title Capletion Release Date 
----- 
Denix Heroux Atlantic City Dec. 79 May 81 
Harold Greenberg Terror Train Dec. 79 Oct. 80 
John Dunning (i) My Bloody Oct. 80 Feb. el 
Valentine 
(ii) Happy Birthday Sept. 80 May 81 
To Me 
Don Goldberg* (i) Meatballs Sept. 78 Aug. 81 
(ii)HeavyMetal Nov.80 Aug. 81 
Garth Drabinsky (i) Tribute May 80 Sept. 81 
(ii) The Changeling Feb. 79 March 80 
Peter Simpson* P r a  Night Sept. 79 Aug. 81 
Pierre David** Scanners Dec. 79 Feb. 81 
...................................................................... 
*~~-producer with Ivan Reitman. Data obtained from Goldberg in a 
telephcne interview in Toronto were corroborated with John Dunning, 
whose company, Cinepix produced the film. Don Goldberg was the writer 
for Heavy Metal . 
**we tried to obtain interviews with these two producers; they were 
unavailable due to their shooting schedules in Hollywood. Other 
Canadian producers -- Robert Lantos, Robert Cooper, and Ron Cohen -- 
were contacted for interviews. They were, however, unavailable due to 
their production schedules. 
Some background information on the eight producers and thei 
was collected f r a  Variety, and C i m a  Canada, the two major 
journals in the United States and Canada respectively. The bac 
information was then used to ask pointed questions about the na 
the deals between producers and their distributors, certain sta 
such as gross rental revenues earned by their films in various k 
markets and the producer's share of such revenues. Face to face 
viewing also allowed for some discussion of certain key issues s 
how the American majors see Canadian film makers and their film 
sources of revenues due to rapid changes occurring in the 
industry brought on by the new technologies, etc. Generally sp 
all interviewees were extremely cooperative and forthright in 
responses to the questions raised during the interview. They wi 
corroborated the data we had found in the trade press which re1 
their films. 
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Terms and Definitions 
------- 
Before we identify the terms used in this study and define 
general outline of the film industry is provided. The featur 
industry in the United States has three principle sectors -- 
tion, distribution, and exhibition -- each with its own specia 
tion. The production sector consists of two major parts: stud 
ductions and films produced by independents. The studios, often 
the Majors, have vertical operations of production -- distributi 
the independent production sector, one ar more individuals bri 
gether the financing and artistic capital such as a director, 
actors, etc., to make a film. It is characterized by high ris 
great deal of competition for both financing and talent. Thes 
ducers, in turn, may sell the rights to market their films in 
territory on certain conditions to a distributor firm. The dist 
acts as the middle agent between the producer and the exhibitor 
own one or more theatres in a given market(s). The distribut 
only secures the play-dates for the producer's film in a given 
but also invests in advertising the picture to generate a 
demand. The distributor also invests in getting the necessary 
of prints made of the film. These expenses are usually charged 
the producer. For rendering this service to the producer, ty 
the distributor charaes a fee of anywhere from 25% to 45% 
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revenues generated at-the box office aher deducting the exhibitor's 
expenses and profit (if any). The exhibitor leases the pictures from a 
distributor on certain conditions and often shares the costs of adver- 
tising the film with the distributor in a specific market. 
It should be noted that the above description should be used as a 
general guide and the actual relations between producers, distributors, 
and exhibitors are far more complex and largely depend on the question 
of who exercises more power over whom. In the United States and Cana- 
dian markets, the locus of power is in the hands of the eight leading 
studios which have production and distribution combinations of their 
own. They are alphabetically: Buena Vista (Disney ), Columbia Pic- 
tures, Twentieth-Century Fox, Orion Pictures, Paramount Pictures, MGN- 
United Artists , Universal Pictures, and Warner Brothers (Huettig , 1944 ; 
Conant, 1960; Pendakur, 1981 ). They have global enterprises in the 
sense that they are represented around the world through their branch 
off ices except in the socialist countries. These eight leading firms 
are called the American majors because of their historical control of 
the United States motion picture industry which, measured .in terms of 
film rental revenues received by them, is usually higher than 90% 
(Variety, 19 January 1983, 131). Although the nunber of pictures they 
themselves make has been on a steady decline in the last several years, 
their market share, which indicates their power, has not diminished. 
There are more than 15,000 theatre screens in the United States 
and several chains control a portion of them.  In the Chicago market, 
where we did a study of relations between distributors and exhibitors 
from which the present study was devised, two national chains were 
present (Pendakur, forthcoming). One of them, P l i t t  Theatres, is 
considered to be the fourth largest theatre chain in the United States 
control1 ing approximately 550 screens. In Chicago, however, with sixty 
screens in i t s  control, P l i t t  Theaters appeared to wholly dominate the 
market. We need not go into much discussion of the theatrical exhibi- 
tion industry here as the present study is concerned with economic 
relationships between the Canadian producers and the American major 
distributors. What is important to note here is that although the 
majors do not own any theatres anymore due to  the Paramount Consent 
Decree of 1948, they have significant influence over the theatres. 
Because the majors supply the theatres with the few block busters (for 
instance, Star Wars) which guarantee the profits to both the parties 
and help write-off any losses incurred by showing the many marginal 
films (Phillips, 1982, 325 - 335). 
In the following are brief explanations of certain key terms used 
in the distribution deals: 
Box Off ice Gross 
---
Revenues collected a t  the theatres in a given market from ticket 
sales to the patrons of a film are called the box office gross. Total 
of a l l  such revenues from al l  the markets in a country are referred to 
as the national box office gross. The exhibitor deducts a certain 
agreed sum of money from each week's box office gross to cover the 
operating expenses of the theatre, which is called the "house-nut". I n  
the Chicago market, a major theatre may deduct approximately $ 7,000 a 
week for the house-nut (Silk interview, 15 July 1983). The theatre 
owner has another important source of revenue which i s  the sale of 
items such as popcorn, candy, and products related to the film such as 
T-shirts, posters, etc. 
Rental Revenues 
This is the most important measure of a film's box office perfor- 
mance in a market as i t  is from these revenues that a producer may get 
his or her share of the revenues. The monies le f t  for the distributor 
after the exhibitor deducts the house-nut and a certain agreed sum of 
money as profits a l l  of which, usually amount to  about 50% of the box 
office gross, are called the rentals or rental revenues. The distribu- 
tor deducts a l l  expenses related to  print,  publicity, shipping, insur- 
ance, etc., which are called launch costs. 
Foreign Markets 
-- -- 
Additional revenues may be earned by gaining entry into major 
foreign markets such as the United Kingdan, West Germany, South Africa, 
France, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina. The American majors depend 
on the foreign markets for 40% to 50% of their rental revenues in any 
given year. Although Canada i s  technically a foreign market, and, the 
largest in terms of rental revenues generated by American films, for 
a l l  practical purposes the majors treat Canada as a part of the U.S. 
domestic market. When Canadian producers talk about foreign marekts , 
however, the U. S. is the most important market for them. I t  has an 
unmatched film and television market in terms of the size of the reve- 
nues generated. Canadian producers look to the Western European mar- 
kets also n o t  only t o  get their product distributed but  also for poten- 
t i a l  financing for their pictures. 
Ancillary Markets 
Conventional television networks and the rapidly expanding cable, 
pay-cable, and home video cassette markets are called the ancillary 
markets. The largest of such markets i s  the United States. The Wes- 
tern European countries are also experiencing similar expansion in 
these new leisure markets. Canadian producers look to them as impor- 
tant sources of revenue for their films. Consistent with industry 
practice, revenues from these markets, however, are spread over several 
years. 
The distribution deals made by film producers and distributors 
could be divided into five basic types: f la t  sale, profit deal, gross 
deal, joint ventures, and complete financing. They are explained 
below: 
Flat Sale 
---- 
A producer may sell  the negative rights to  a picture for a given 
sm of money in a given market which is obtained before the picture i s  
exhibited. Although one sees the money upfront and no risk may be 
involved, i t  is not a desired method of sale for the producer because 
he or she will not share any profits if the picture i s  a success. 
Prcf it Deal or Net Disbribution Deal 
.---- 
This is the basic method used by the American majors when they 
acquire independently produced films for distribution in the United 
States and other markets. The distributor agrees to pay the negative 
cost of a film and then structures the deal in such a way that all the 
launch costs will be first deducted from the film's rental revenues. 
It should be noted here that the theatres charge approximately 50% of 
the box office gross as their house-nut and profit. The distributor 
also charges a fee which ranges anywhere from 25% to 45% of the film 
rental. Independent producers claim that they seldom see any profits 
from this type of deal. 
When we asked John Dunning of Cinepix why the profit deal was not 
desirable to him, he replied in the following manner: 
Say I have a film that will cost four million. Then they 
say, "We'll give you the four million, but you won't see 
anything until we record two and one-half to three times our 
costs." So they start structuring the deal, and this is 
where we start to get cut to pieces. So you now have ten 
million to recoup before you start seeing any profit on that 
film. That means you have to do at least twenty million 
dollars in the theaters because they keep about 50% - 55%, 
so you have got to do at least twenty million there. Then 
comes the thing. They say, "Look, he have this national 
advertising ..a maximum of say no more than five million 
dollars." Now we're at twenty-five million. Then they say, 
"But we're also entitled to a distributor's fee of 20% - 
30%." Now we're at thirty-five million. Nw your film has 
to gross seventy million in the box office before you even 
break-even. If you look at some of the films that have 
grossed over seventy million dollars, it's six pictures that 
did it, out of a release pattern of maybe forty films. So, 
you haven't got a chance to make any money. 
A distributor may also require cross collateral ization of revenues 
across territories and/or across ancillary markets as was done in the 
case of some films in the study sample. This policy, while protecting 
the distributor by minimizing its risks, adversely affects the produ- 
cer by reducing his or her revenues. 
In some deals of this type, a non-refundable guarantee may be 
involved. It is paid by the distributor to the producer of 'the film on 
the delivery of a film for release. While it ensures the supply of 
product to the distributer, it also guarantees at least a portion of 
the investment made by the producer(s) in making the film whether or 
not the film succeeds in its exhibition. 
Gross Distribution 
--- 
This is a powerful deal for the independent Canadian producer 
because it places the producer on an equal footing with the distributor 
in recouping his or her share of the revenues. The gross distribution 
deal (or gross deal) has thref important characteristics, which make it 
attractive to independent producers: ( 1 ) advance, (2) participation 
f r a  the first dollar for the producer, and (3) the distributor absorb- 
ing the launch costs. It means that the distributor advances a certain 
s m  of money to obtain the distribution rights to the film, which are 
later deducted from the rental, if the picture makes money. Participa- 
tion fran the first dollar means that the producer begins to draw fran 
the first dollar of gross film rental generated from all sources by the 
distributor. The distributor may pay all or part of the advertising, 
prints, and other exploitation costs of the film. The percentages of 
revenues accruing to the producer will escalate according to the degree 
of film rentals generated by the distributor. Those percentages vary 
depending on the clout that a producer has and the market potential a 
film may have in the eyes of the distributor. One producer told us 
that if one can cut a ten percent gross deal it was considered excel- 
lent. Another stated that a deal may start from twenty-five percent of 
the first dollar and escalate in favor of the producer to as high as 
sixty or seventy percent depending on the size of the rentals. 
When rentals start coming in, the distributor may first recoup the 
advance paid before paying the agreed share to the producer. Such 
modif ications to the deal , called modified gross deal , would be nego- 
tiated between the two parties. 
Joint Ventures 
-- 
A producer may seek a part of the investment in a film from a 
distributor to accomplish several objectives. One may be to guarantee 
distribution to the film on its completion and, two to boost the inves- 
tors' confidence in coming forth with their money to make the film in 
the first place. If the financing is coming from more than one source, 
let us say foreign territory distributors, pay-television, network 
television, etc., not only is the risk spread out among them but also 
market entry is assured. 
Complete _Financing 
A producer may obtain all the necessary monies needed to make a 
film fran a major distributor and in turn sell certain rights of the 
film to that company. Invariably, the distributor would ask for rights 
to theatrical, foreign, and ancillary markets as well as the flexibili- 
ty to cross collaterlize the revenues. This type of deal brings Cana- 
dian producers all sorts of problems which are discussed in the follow- 
ing section. 
~ 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Table Two presents a summary o f  f i n d i n g s  regarding the various 
sources o f  revenue f o r  the selected ten Canadian f i l m s  and the  s t ruc-  
t u r e  o f  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  deals worked ou t  by t h e  producers w i t h  the 
American majors. Except f o r  the two f i lms ,  Heavy Metal, and P m  
Night,  whose producers were unavai lab le f o r  our in te rv ieks  due t o  t h e i r  
shooting schedules, the  data presented were obtained from t h e  producers 
d i r e c t l y .  I n  the  case o f  Tr ibute,  income f r a n  a n c i l l a r y  markets i s  n o t  
broken down by network and pay- te lev is ion and U.S. versus Canadian 
because the  producer could n o t  remember these d e t a i l s .  A word o f  
caut ion regarding the f i g u r e s  i n  t h i s  t a b l e  i s  t h a t  they should be read 
as ,nearest approximations an i n d i v i d u a l  producer could make. The 
audited f i n a n c i a l  statements o f  each f i l m  may produce s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r -  
ent  f i g u r e s .  As t h e  interviewee was r e c o l l e c t i n g  these s t a t i s t i c s  and 
not looking a t  account books, these f igu res  may d i f f e r  f r a n  the ones i n  
the account books. What i s  important f o r  the  present analys is ,  how- 
ever, i s  t h a t  these data reveal the pat terns of terms and condi t ions 
worked ou t  by t h e  producers w i t h  t h e  U.S. d i s t r i b u t o r s  . Consequently, 
they are usefu l  guides to understand the actual  p o l i c i e s  and t h e i r  
pract ices i n  t h e  U.S. motion p i c t u r e  indust ry .  
Three f i lms i n  t h i s  study -- Happy Bi r thday to Me, Scanners, and 
The Changeling -- were sold t o  the U.S. d i s t r i b u t o r s  on the basis o f  a 
p r o f i t  deal. Their respect ive co-producers were: John Dunning, Claude 
Heroux, and Garth Drabinsky. I n  each f i l m l s  case, the d i s t r i b u t o r  
advanced subs tan t ia l  sums o f  money t o  t h e  producer f o r  t h e  d e l i v e r y  o f  
the f i l m  and i n  each case the pa t te rn  was to cross c o l l a t e r a l i z e  t h e  
gross ren ta ls .  This meant t h a t  losses i n  t h e  t h e a t r i c a l  markets were 
made up by a n c i l l a r y  market sale o f  the f i l m  by the d i s t r i b u t o r .  While 
t h a t  company1 s r i s k  was minimized by cross c o l l a t e r a l  i z a t i o n  , the  
producer may have recouped. less f r a n  the gross renta ls .  This i s  c lea r -  
l y  ev ident  i n  t h e  case o f  The Changeling and Scanners, which had U.S. 
ren ta ls  o f  $ 5.3 m i l l i o n  and $ 6 m i l l i o n  respect ive ly .  However, as the 
producer had t o  wa i t  u n t i l  t h e  d i s t r i b u t o r  recouped various costs 
associated w i th  launching the f i l m  and the comnission, the share f o r  
the producers was considerably low. New World, the  d i s t r i b u t o r ,  spent 
$ 10 m i l l i o n  i n  launching Scanners and the investors o f  t h a t  f i l m  have 
t o  wa i t  a long t ime t o  recoup t h e i r  $ 4 m i l l i o n  investment. Claude 
Heroux, one o f  the producers o f  the  f i l m  stated t h a t  although the  
producers have received $ 2.9 m i l l i o n  f r a n  the d i s t r i b u t o r ,  the f i l m  
would have generated h igher  r e n t a l s  i f  it was d i s t r i b u t e d  by a major 
d i s t r i b u t o r .  A major could have arranged f o r  a na t iona l  break w i th  one 
thousand p r i n t s  o r  more and a b igger  adver t i s ing  campaign, whereas New 
World exp lo i ted  the p i c t u r e  w i t h  three hundred t o  fou r  hundred p r i n t s  
on a t e r r i t o r y  by t e r r i t o r y  re lease pa t te rn .  
TABLE TWO 
TABLE lW0 (Cont 'd) 
8. Tribute; 80; 
$8.4 
9. Baavy Hetal; 80; 
A 
$6 
2 10. Prol ~ight; 79 
are 
POX 
Columbia 
Avco- 
hbasay 
Pancadian Various Profit Deal $13.5 
(advance; 
minimum crosm 
colleratization) 
Pd-dim Pox Groam Deal - 
(advance; 
minimum cross 
collateralization) 
Columbia Columbia Gross Deal $25-30 
(advance) 
-- -- Not horn -- 
$2.5 (UBC) No pay TV sale in 
$300,00O(CTV) Canada yet. Class action suit in 
$550.000(880) Canada by 264 investors against 
producers; AFD went out of 
business. 
$3.6 (a11 Good launch. Problem with 
nources) critics; advertising problems. 
a o t  horn- 
The co-producer o f  the f i l m ,  The Changeling, s tated t h a t  he had 
secured a good deal f o r  t h a t  f i l m  w i th  minimun cross c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n  
and an advance. However, t h e  d i s t r i b u t o r  o f  t h e  f i l m ,  American F i lm 
D i s t r i b u t o r s ,  a minor canpany, had many f i n a n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a t  t h e  
t ime and could n o t  ho ld t h e  dates they had obtained from t h e  theatres 
i n  many c i t i e s .  It eventual ly  went out o f  business thereby a f f e c t i n g  
the  f i l m ' s  grossing p o t e n t i a l .  The f i l m  was so ld i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
markets extremely we l l  according to Garth Drabinsky. He explained why 
the  revenues from these markets were n o t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t rong i n  the  
fo l low ing  manner: 
... the  t r o u b l e  when you are deal ing w i th  a f o r e i g n  t e r r i -  
to ry ,  you always have t o  concern yoursel f  wi th  the solvency 
o f  the  various t e r r i t o r y  d i s t r i b u t o r s .  And i n  several i n -  
stances, they went bankrupt along the way and we had t o  
reassign t h e  r i g h t s  t o  a new t e r r i t o r y  d i s t r i b u t o r .  
The p r o f i t  deal made for  Happy Bi r thday To Me wi th  Colunbia Pic-  
tures, a U.S. major was, however, an exception. Since it was budgeted 
f o r  $ 4 m i l l i o n  and t h e  producer obtained more than t h a t  amount i n  t h e  
form o f  an advance f r a n  Columbia, i t s  investors recouped completely 
even before t h e  f i l m  was released. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t h e a t r i c a l  sales 
brought another t w  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  plus to the producers. The d i s t r i -  
butor  i t s e l f  may n o t  have done t o o  badly as the  f i l m ' s  U.S. box o f f i c e  
gross was approximately $ 18 m i l l i o n  w i th  ren ta ls  o f  $ 5 m i l l i o n .  
Happy Bi r thday To Me and Scanners have no t  been so ld  t o  a U.S. t e l e v i -  
sion network ye t  probably because they are considered too  v i o l e n t  by 
t h e  Network Standards and Pract ices departments. John Dunning, the  co- 
producer o f  Happy Bi r thday To Me stated t h a t  o v e r a l l  it was a good 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  deal : 
We had a fee,  no t  as much as we'd have l i k e d ,  because we had 
t o  put  i n  some f o r  the music. But our investors saw t h e i r  
d o l l a r s  back. The s tud io  got  a good f i l m  and made money. 
I t ' s  a n ice  deal i f  everybody makes a b i t .  
One o f  the ways a producer can mot ivate a d i s t r i b u t o r  t o  s e l l  a 
f i l m  more aggressively i n  the case o f  a p r o f i t  deal i s  t o  requ i re  a 
"best e f f o r t s 1 '  clause i n  the  con t rac t .  That clause i s  suspect t o  the  
independent producers, however, because it i s  near ly  impossible t o  
demonstrate what would be considered "best e f f o r t s "  by t h e  two p a r t i e s  
i n  marketing a f i l m .  Garth Drabinsky emphatical ly s tated t h a t  a best 
e f f o r t s  clause i s  "absurd from t h e  viewpoint o f  producers" f o r  the 
fo l low ing  reasons: 
You spend m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  i n  c rea t ing  a valuable asset,  
then t o  hand t h a t  asset over w i th  no considerat ion other 
than t h e i r  best e f f o r t s  and t h e i r  commitment t o  spend a 
ce r ta in  amount o f  money down the road and they open on a 
selected basis i n  a reg ional  market f o r  example and the  
p i c t u r e  doesn't  perform, they walk away f r a n  t h e i r  
obligation and say, "sue me fo r  damages." I t  will be 
cheaper for  t h e n  to defend thei r  action than to meet t h e i r  
commitment. Now you've t ied  up your product i n  l i t i ga t ion ;  
nobody else will touch the picture and there ' s  no future fo r  
i t .  So you got t o  be nuts t o  give away a picture without 
consideration up front. 
I t  appears tha t  when an independent producer i s  i n  a s t i tua t ion where 
the distr ibutor offers only a profi t  deal, the best option i s  to t r y  
and get an advance t o  cover as much of the negative cost  as possible. 
John Dunning explained the predicament of  an independent producer like 
himself in the following way: 
Most people are working in th i s  for a fee. If you' ve a 
producer's fee buil t- in,  the American studios accept a 
reasonable producer's fee,  about $ 200,000. So, you're not 
starving, but what's denied you i s  the prof i t  motive. Andre 
Link (his partner) and I 've  always liked the carrot ,  and the 
carrot  in t h i s  business i s  l ike a race horse. You want t o  
get the winner. And i t ' s  not the fee because we've lost our 
fee money many times e i ther  t o  completion of the film or 
because we've put i t  back into the workings to get a new 
soundtrack or something. We're suckers tha t  way, because i f  
i t s  ei ther plug i t  or starve,  we'll pledge our fee. We l ike  
the idea of action and of the  prof i t  motive. 
Six of the ten films i n  t h i s  study were sold by the i r  producers to 
U.S. distr ibutors on the basis of a gross deal. As explained before, 
this  type of deal i s  most desirable to independent producers as the i r  
negative costs may often be covered by an advance or a non-refundable 
guarantee. In fac t ,  those amounts often may be so high that  would put 
the producer i n  a prof i t  position even before the picture i s  released. 
We will i l l u s t r a t e  two examples below to draw out the subtle differen- 
ces in the two gross deals. 
Paramount Pictures acquired Meatballs on a gross deal basis 
paying an advance of two million dollars plus for U.S. theatrical  
rights and also brought the Canadian theatrical  r ights separately with 
a nonrefundable guarantee of $ 350,000 CAN. Paramount had correctly 
assessed box off ice  pctential of tha t  low budget comedy film and there- 
by secured foreign theatrical  rights for it. The producers were i n  a 
profi t  position before the f i l m ' s  release. Of the $ 22 million in 
theatrical rental generated by the film, which made i t  a "sleeper" by 
industry standards, the producers received an additional sum of $ 5 
million. Paramount also made a small comission on the sale of ancil- 
lary rights of the  f i lm. John Dunning called the deal "a sweetheart 
deal" because i t  was so profitable to a l l  parties concerned. 
Atlantic City, produced a t  a cost of $ 6 million was sold on the 
basis of a gross deal but did not get an advance from Paramount Pic- 
t ~ r e s .  The producers argued that  getting ar advance often raises the 
d i s t r i b u t o r ' s  comnission on a n c i l l a r y  market sales t o  anywhere i n  the 
range o f  f i f t e e n  t o  t h i r t y  percent. I n  t h e  case o f  t h i s  f i l m ,  Para- 
mount made a ten percent commission on the sale o f  a n c i l l a r y  r i g h t s .  
Although A t l a n t i c  C i t y  had many saleable ingredients ,  i t s  produ- 
cers found it hard t o  s e l l  it t o  t h e  majors. It was d i r e c t e d  by Louis 
Mal le, who i s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  known. It featured an American s ta r ,  
Bur t  Lancaster. It had a lso  won an award a t  the  Venice In te rna t iona l  
F i lm Fes t i va l  i n  1980. I t s  producer s tated t h a t  those a t t r i b u t e s  o f  
the  f i l m  gave him on ly  confidence i n  s e l l i n g  t h e  f i l m  but  t h e  sa le t o  
Paramount was tough t o  make. He asserted t h a t  the c r i t i c a l  acclaim won 
by the f i l m  helped him s e l l  it i n  f o r e i g n  t e r r i t o r i e s  such as England. 
The f i l m  has ye t  to recoup .f 4 m i l  l i o n  o f  investors money, twenty 
percent o f  which came from France and the r e s t  from pub l i c  u n i t s  sold 
to Canadians under the  tax  she l te r  scheme. 
A t l a n t i c  C i t y  grossed $ 10 m i l l i o n  i n  the  U S .  t h e a t r i c a l  market 
and was sold t o  CBS-TV f o r  $ 1.5 m i l l i o n  and t o  Hane Box O f f i c e  f o r  
$3.5 m i l l i o n .  Although Paramount made f i f t y  to s i x t y  p r i n t s  o f  t h e  
f i l m  and released it area by area, it d i d  n o t  seem t o  have a handle on 
how t o  market t h a t  f i l m .  Our analysis done elsewhere o f  t h a t  f i l m ' s  
release pa t te rn  and i t s  box o f f i c e  performance i n  the  Chicago market 
bears out  t h a t  argument (Pendakur, forthcoming). Denis Heroux, the co- 
producer o f  t h e  f i l m ,  agreed t h a t  Paramount had d i f f i c u l t y  marketing 
the f i l m  i n  the U.S. as they could not  fit it i n t o  a neat category such 
as crime-drama and so on. He f u r t h e r  stated: 
The problem w i th  us i s  t h a t ' s  the k ind o f  movie we want to 
do. Movies t h a t  are d i f f e r e n t  and o r i g i n a l  t h a t  d o n ' t  enter  
a category. So, we have t o  s u f f e r  f o r  it. 
To our quest ion whether g e t t i n g  an advance and other  favorable t e n s  on 
a gross deal depends on an independent's reputat ion,  Garth Drabinsky 
explained i n  the  f o l l o w i n g  b l u n t  terms: 
Well, i f  you produce a dog, a l l  the c l o u t  i n  the world i s n ' t  
going t o  deters ine your contract .  You produce a p i c t u r e  
they want a l o t ,  then demand creates pos i t i on  to be able t o  
negotiate. 
We asked John Dunning i f  t h e  major Canadian producers are i n  a p o s i t i o n  
t o  demand gross deals f r a n  the U.S. majors now t h a t  they have exper'ien- 
ce and perhaps some recogni t ion.  He rep l ied :  
I don' t  t h i n k  Canadians are demanding anything. We're down 
there  w i th  our hats  i n  our hands, hoping somebody w i l l  do 
it. I d o n ' t  t h i n k  we can demand anything, because I d o n ' t  
t h i n k  the Americans are look ing f o r  us t o  make anything bu t  
t rouble.  
Dunning was also pessimistic about the acceptance of Canadian producers 
despite all the "success" stories reported in the trade press. His 
remarks below are humorous b u t  at the same time very pointed about the 
nature of the relationships between the Canadian producers and the 
American f i lm industry. 
You go down to  L.A., and you're a Canadian, they used to 
have what they would call in one of the agencies, the 
Canadian agent, which was 1 ike Siberia. Being sentenced to 
the Canadian agent was like you were either on your way out 
of the agency or they didn't know what to  do with you. You 
say, "I want Burt Reynolds", now I m supposing, because I 
don't remember who's who. (The agent) would try t o  give you 
these old stars who weren't very credible anymore, who were 
looking for work, or who had tax problems.. . .The only reason 
they would come up here was to solve a tax problem or that 
they needed money, b u t  there was no respect given to the 
Canadian film industry down there, and I'm not sure how much 
is given to i t  s t i l l .  
I t  appears to  us that even when Canadian producers make pictures that 
may f i t  the American mass market needs as Drabinsky, Dunning, and 
Greenberg have done, whether or not they will get a gross deal depends 
entirely on the majors1 priorities at a given time. Dunning's Meat- 
balls sale to Paramount attests to that fact: 
They (Paramount) wanted a summer film and wanted this film 
very badly. They said, "O.k., we'll give you a deal. We're 
on a sliding scale. The advance was deducted from what 
we're going to earn. Then we're at twelve and a half per- 
cent and we went u p  in percentage as they recouped more and 
more of the money. So, we started at twelve percent recoup 
at twelve mil lion do1 lars , i t  went to  twenty-two percent, 
then to  twenty-seven percent and finally way there to forty 
- f i f ty  percent. They absorbed their own distribution ex- 
penses in their part. We started to see dollars and re- 
couped close to  five million on the film. 
Even when one gets a gross deal with an advance, if the revenues are 
cross collateralized by a major across territories in theatrical mar- 
kets, the producer would have to lose out to the distributor. Denis 
Herouxl s mass marketed film, Quest For Fire, distributed by Twentieth- 
Century Fox, had a gross deal with an advance of three million dollars. 
Its launch costs were twelve million dollars. The film's U.S. box 
office gross was twenty million dollars and Canadian box office gross 
was six million dollars. As these revenues were not spl i t  due to  cross 
collateralization done by the distributor, the producer received less 
revenue from the rentals. I t  i s  only when a film produced under two 
million dollars earns a box office gross of f ifty-five million dollars 
as Meatballs d id ,  having a gross deal not only protected the producer's 
investment but  a lso assured a good share o f  p r o f i t s .  Such instances o f  
success are extremely ra re  i n  t h i s  industry. 
A way out  o f  cross c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  gross r en ta l  revenues by 
d i s t r i bu to r s  appears to be j o i n t  ventures, a method o f  f inancing and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  used by some o f  the  producers i n  our sample. Harold 
Greenberg pre-sold the fo re ign  markets i n  the case of  Terror T ra in  
(negative cost $ 2.5 m i l l i o n )  f o r  $ 1.2 m i l l i o n  which l e f t  him w i th  $ 
1.3 m i l l i o n  t o  recover. The deal made w i th  Twentieth-Century Fox 
assured t ha t  sun of  money and if the p ic tu re  had not done we l l  a t  t h e  
box o f f i c e ,  the a n c i l l a r y  r i g h t s  would have brought i n  some add i t iona l  
revenues to the producer. Greenberg's mega h i t ,  Porky's, budgeted a t  
s i x  m i l l i o n  do l l a r s  was another c lear  example of  how equi ty  pa r t i c i pa -  
t i o n  i s  being used by h i s  company t o  minimize h i s  r i s k :  
I n  a deal l i k e  Porky's, the f inancing came t h i r t y -n i ne  and a 
h a l f  percent ou t  o f  Me1 Simon (an American production c m -  
pany ) , t h i r t y  -eight percent out o f  As t ra l  and twenty -e ight  
percent out o f  Twentieth-Century Fox. Again Fox d i d  not 
have t e r r i t o r i a l  r igh ts .  What t h a t  accmplishes and why we 
go t ha t  rou te  i s  t h a t  we don ' t  have cross c o l l a t e r a l i z a t i o n  
of  fore ign countr ies. I n  some countr ies, you make money and 
i n  some you lose money. I n  the  countr ies you lose money, if 
you have minimun guarantee, you don ' t  get hurt.  I n  the  
countr ies you make money, it goes r i g h t  t o  bottom l i ne .  
Otherwise, i f  you give it to one source on a cross c o l l a t e r -  
a l i za t i on ,  n ine out  o f  t en  times you w i l l  f i n d  you don ' t  ge t  
any returns. [Figures given by Mr. Greenberg do not add up 
t o  hundred .I 
These Canadian producers have had t o  seek f inanc ing  from elsewhere f o r  ; 
a  nunber of reasons inc luding the amendments made t o  the tax  she l te r  
po l i c y  i n  Canada i n  1981 - 1982. V i r t u a l l y  a l l  venture c a p i t a l  f o r  
f i l m  production was reported t o  have d r ied  up. So, the equi ty  p a r t i c i -  : 
pat ion method i s  used by the  producers t o  not  only  f i n d  the  necessary 1 
cap i ta l  f ran  a l l  sources inc luding fo re ign  sources but also t o  seek 
minimum pa r t i c i pa t i on  from the  American majors. Greenberg explained ) 
the reasons f o r  such a po l i c y  i n  the fo l low ing  way: 
With the majors, the more money you ask them, the more / I  
r i gh t s  they take. As equi ty  par t i c ipan ts ,  when we mir,imized I 
t he  investment o f  t he  U.S. majors, we're able t o  construct  a I 
deal which d i d n ' t  t i e  up the anc i l l a r y  r igh ts .  Again it I 
qoes down t o  the ~ o i n t  h a t  the  maiors, when they ~ e t  I 
h v o l v e d  w i th  a f i l m ,  they look a t  tke i r -expendi tures i n d  
what i s  t h e i r  downside protect ion.  The lower the r i s k  
fac to rs ,  the more you can negot ia te on the upside. 
As upfront  money from fo re i gn  sales i s  becoming increasingly  scarce 
these days, the Canadian producers appear t o  be u t i l i z i n g  the co- 
production t r e a t i e s  t h a t  Canada has w i th  s i x  countr ies -- France, 
United Kingdom, West Germany, I s r a e l ,  and I t a l y  -- t o  work ou t  j o i n t  
ventures there. Harald Greenberg and Denis Heroux appear t o  be suc- 
cessful  i n  generat ing a s izeable share o f  the  f i l m s '  budgets through 
co-production j o i n t  ventures. Greenberg explained the r a t i o n a l e  f o r  
t h a t  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way: 
We normally lock, and i n  the past,  hope t o  get  f i f t y  percent 
o f  our budget ou t  o f  -- lower budgets, $ 2 and 3 m i l l  i on  -- 
out o f  fo re ign  sales. That 's  becoming very d i f f i c u l t  today. 
The areas where we're spending more o f  our t ime i s  t o  do co- 
productions w i th  European countr ies. We look fo r  f o r t y  
percent o f  con t r ibu t ions  f o r  our co-productions t o  come out  
of fo re ign  t e r r i t o r i e s  as p a r t  o f  our co-production t r e a t y  
w i th  various countr ies.  You do p i c k  up add i t i ona l  revenues 
out of countr ies t h a t  are not  p a r t  of the t rea t ies .  I f  you 
d i d  add those two together ,  t h a t ' s  what we look f o r .  
Denis Heroux and John Kemeny are cu r ren t l y  producing three feature 
f i l m s  -- Louisiana, Le Crime DIOvide P lou f fe ,  and Le Sand Des Autres -- 
along w i th  a six-hour t e l e v i s i o n  min i -ser ies a l l  of which have a can- 
bined budget o f  approximately f o r t y  s i x  m i l  l i o n  do1 l a r s .  These are 
j o i n t  ventures done w i th  European, American, and Canadian t e l e v i s i o n  
companies coupled w i th  t h e a t r i c a l  r i g h t s  pre-sa le wherever poss ib le .  
One important omission i n  t h i s  package i s  the U.S. t h e a t r i c a l  market 
sale. Heroux claimed t h a t  one t h i r d  o f  t h e  budget came from French 
te lev is ion ,  another t h i r d  fr.om Horn Box O f f i c e  i n  the U.S., and another 
t h i r d  from Canadian pay- te lev is ion,  conventional t e l e v i s i o n  r i g h t s  a l l  
canbined. He has also generated a f o u r t h  t h i r d ,  as he ca l led  it, from 
a sales agent who i s  p r e - s e l l i n g  the  package a t  d i f fe ren t  f i l m  and 
t e l e v i s i o n  f e s t i v a l s  around the world. 
As Heroux makes e s s e n t i a l l y  very d i f f e r e n t  kinds of f i lms  from t h e  
mass or iented f i l m s  t h a t  Greenberg and Dunning do, we asked him how he 
can ignore the  l a r g e s t  t h e a t r i c a l  market i n  t h e  world, the U.S., and 
s t i l l  expect t o  survive. He rep l ied :  
I t h i n k  we can on ly  surv ive through t h e  other a n c i l l a r y  
r i g h t s  -- pay-tv, conventional t v ,  and syndicat ion. Forget 
t h e  U.S. ( t h e a t r i c a l )  main market. For us, t h e  main 
marketing comes f rw Europe. We f inance our f i lms w i t h  
f i f t y  percent European, twenty -f i v e  percent Canadian , and 
twenty-f  i v e  percent American cap i ta l .  So, then i f it works 
i n  the  U.S. t h e a t r i c a l  market, i t ' s  e x t r a  i c i n g  on the  cake. 
We don ' t  ta rge t  the U.S. Well, I 'rr not saying everybody 
must do t h a t ,  t h a t ' s  t h e i r  problem. But t h a t ' s  what we're 
doing. 
Since 1978, the  American majors have provided complete f i nanc ing  f o r  
several f i l m s  i n  Canada. When the majors f inance the e n t i r e  cost o f  a 
f i l m ,  however, it does no t  make t h e  independent producer's task  any 
e a s i e r .  In f a c t ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  i s  t h a t  a s imple  l i t t l e  f i l m  producer had 
i n  mind t akes  on monstrous propor t ions .  Furthermore,  t h e r e  may not  be 
any p r o f i t s  t o  sha re .  John Dunning expla ined t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between a 
Hollywcod s t y l e  f i lm  and a f i lm  which he has sold to a major on a 
p r o f i t  dea l  o r  g r o s s  dea l  b a s i s :  
Hormally we go i n ,  c u t  our d e a l ,  and go away. Some guy 
f l i e s  up sometimes s a y s ,  "What're you doing?,"  looks  a t  our 
ma te r i a l  f o r  them, goes back. T h a t ' s  t h e  way we do i t ,  
because we a r e  a f r e e  hand. 
He found out  how r e s t r i c t i v e  i t  was t o  work under t h e  Hollywood s t u d i o  
system when he r e c e n t l y  produced Space Hunter (1983) f o r  Columbia 
P ic tu res :  
Ivan (Reitman) had a b ig  development dea l  with Columbia. We 
showed him t h i s  Road Warrior ,  s c i - f i  type of t h ing  we wanted 
t o d o  f o r  $ 4 m i l l i o n .  A n i c e  l i t t l e ,  low budget f i lm .  I 
had a Canadian d i r e c t o r  and everything was s e t .  Ivan l i k e d  
it and s a i d ,  " I ' l l  g e t  you a d i s t r i b u t i c n  deal.'' ... So,  he 
t a k e s  i t  t o  Columbia and i t  s t a r t s .  "You have t o  f i x  t h i s ,  
you have t o  f i x  tha t . "  So, we f i x  t h i s  and t h a t .  "You have 
t o  t a k e  i t  o f f  t h e  world,  i t s  too depres s ing .  Take i t  t o  
another  p lanet ."  The c o s t s  a r e  s t a r t i n g  to run,  but t hey  
s a y ,  "Ok, we're going t o  do i t .  Get a budget." So, by t h i s  
t ime,  t h e  budget has gone f r m  f o u r  to  s i x  mi l l i on .  Now, we 
have t o  c r e a t e  a whole new p l a n e t .  They s a y ,  "Ok, w e ' l l  do 
it in 3-D because t h e  big 3-D market was coming in." They 
s a i d ,  "Everybody i s  doing a 3 4 ,  and Columbia d o e s n ' t  have 
one." They f e l t  they could beat  every one including Jaws 3- 
D by g e t t i n g  i t  out  quickly .  We're known f o r  doing f i l m s  
quickly .  We're no t  t o o  happy about 3-D because i t s  s ca ry .  
I ' d  seen 3-D t h a t  worked r e a l l y  well. Then another  mi l l i on  
and h a l f  i s  added t o  t h e  budget ,  because i ts  double camera,  
you c a n ' t  shoot as f a s t ,  e t c .  Suddenly, we're a t  seven 
m i l l i o n  f ive,  and i t  keeps go ing ,  and then  we'd do r e shoo t .  
In  t h e  dec i s ion  making, we l o s t  because the s t u d i o  took it 
ove r .  The completion gua ran to r  was i n  on ly  one day ,  because 
he took one look a t  t h e  mess and r a n ,  and Colunbia took ove r  
t h e  whole t h i n g .  We just s o r t  o f  s tood by and watched t h i s  
f i lm  t a k e  off .... I t ' s  a t y p i c a l  evoluticm of t h e  Hollywood 
s t y l e  f i l m ,  and t h i s  was o u r  only  expe r i ence  wi th  a Holly- 
wood s t y l e  f i l m ,  one sho t  and con t ro l l ed  by t h e  studio...Our 
Canadian d i r e c t o r  just went under and around t h e  3-0 p a r t .  
I t  just became too  much f o r  him. 
The f i l m  was f i n a l l y  d i r e c t e d  by an American, Larnont Johnson. Dunning 
commented on t h e  whole exper ience  in t h i s  way: 
We probably see less out of a twelve million dollar film 
than we see out of David's (Cronenberg) early s tu f f ,  even 
with the ancillary rights. 
IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS FOR CANADA'S NATIONAL POLICY 
Canada has made substantial investments to boost local film pro- 
duction since 1968. Table Three l i s t s  to ta l  expenditures in Canada's 
film industry fran 1977 to 1981 and the nunber of films produced each 
year. 
In those f ive  years,  a to t a l  of approximately f ive  hundred million 
dollars has been spent in Canada making feature films nunbering approx- 
imately two hundred and twenty-nine. These data reveal tha t  most of 
the investment has come fran private sources to make films in Canada. 
Direct investment from the Canadian Film Development Corporation i s  a 
very small percentage of that  sun as i t s  annual revolving fund for  
interim financing does not exceed four million dollars.  I t  i s  d i f f i -  
cult to estimate how much the Canadian tax payer i s  paying out to  
subsidize film production a t  home via the tax shelter  (currently f i f t y  
percent of  the investment in the f i r s t  year and f i f t y  percent in the 
second) provided for the venture cap i t a l i s t s  who finance films in 
Canada. What is important to note, hcwever, i s  that  current film 
policy i n  Canada, a t  least  since 1978, i s  based on the fundamental 
assumption that  if local producers are shored up by creating Support 
mechanisms such as the Capital Cost Allowance Program, and the Canadian 
Film Development Corporation, and the newly announced Broadcast Fund of 
thirty-five million dollars fo r  prime time television program produc- 
tion, the industry would be on firm ground. The current film policy i s  
also based on the  belief tha t  i f  Canadians could make films acceptable 
to the American majors and other tuyers i n  the U.S., one need not do 
anything about the oppressive market conditions faced by Canadian 
independent producers, distr ibutors,  and exhibitors in the domestic 
market. The data we have presented in t h i s  study showing the penetra- 
tion of Canadian product into the U.S. theatrical  and other markets 
seem to  support tha t  such policy may in f a c t  have worked t o  benefit the 
Canadian film industry. However, if the data are subjected to some 
rigorous analysis, we may find tha t  the economic relat ions which have 
evolved since 1978 between Canadian producers and American majors may 
be on thin ice. In the following, l e t  us consider the plcture from a 
broader perspective and analyze the pr ior i t ies  of the two parties 
involved. 
TABLE THREE 
Estimated Ex~enditures in Canada's Film Production from Government a I Private Sources, 1977 - 1981 (dollar figures are in millions). 
1. Total Canadian feature film 
production in dollars 
2. Total production in number 
of films 
3. CFDC assisted production in 
dollars 
4. CFDC assisted production in 
numbers of films 
5. CFDC financial assistance 
(equity and interim loans) 
6. Total short production in 
dollars 
Source: Briefing Document, Prepared By the Canadian Film 
Development Corporation For its Appearance At the 
Standing Committee on Culture and Communications, 
April 8,1982. 
Table Four provides an estimate of the number of feature films 
launched worldwide by American companies in the years 1981 - 1983. 
While the table shows that the majors are doing fewer films at home 
every year, they increased their domestic production by 54% between 
1982 and 1983. They have doubled their offshore production from 1981 
1983. A number of factors explain why increased offshore production 
is occurring, such as the current strength of the U.S. dollar versus 
European and other currencies, restrictions on foreign earnings, and 
lucrative tax shelters abroad, only to name a few. Even if Canada is 
getting a small share of these branch plant films at present, in the 
long run it is hard to tell if the majors would continue to do such 
films in Canada. The historic experience of the British Film industry 
(Guback, 1969) and Canada's own "quota quickies" history (Morris, 1978, 
175 - 216) attest t o  the fact that such offshore production by American 
majors cannot be taken as a permanent phenomenon. One could speculate 
the possibility that if Mexico (or some other country) offers better 
tens and conditions to make their films, then the majors would not 
hesitate to move to that country or elsewhere. As they are the leading 
multinational corporations involved in film production and distribu- 
tion, clearly they would make their financial , marketing, production, 
and other decisions based on their activities not within one country 
alone, even when that country is their "horn" base. That is the basic 
law governing the multinationals' investment behaviour. 
A more complex and revealing picture of the majors' policies 
related to production and acquisition abroad is provided in Table Five. 
It presents data regarding the American majors' releases and compares 
it with in-house versus outside acquisitions for the years 1980 to 
1984. While the total nunber of in-house films released by the eight 
American majors for these years went down from 75 in 1980 to 83 in 
1984, their releases of pick-ups fran around the world have doubled 
from 37 in 1980 to 74 in 1984. This is the most crucial policy affect- 
ing Canadians favorably so far. It should be noted that the Major 
Classics Divisions, which have sought products and profits from essen- 
tially what used to be the domain of independent distributors, have 
shown a dramatic growth in their acquisitions and releases from one 
film in 1980 to 33 in 1984. Drabinsky and Dunning, two of the produ- 
cers interviewed in this study who have integrated production-distribu- 
tion companies, stated that their operations were negatively affected 
by the Classics Divisions. This policy has had a devastating effect on 
many small Canadian owned Independent distribution companies such as 
New Cinema Enterprises and Saguenay Films resulting in their bank- 
The Canadians not only have to make products that are acceptable 
to the majon but have to assume while doing them that the majors would 
continue with their current policy of acquiring a high ratio of their 
releases from outside the U.S. If the in-house releases keep on de- 
clining as they did in the years 1980 - 1984 from 67% to 53%, Canadian 
Producers have some choice in whether or not their products would get 
into the U.S. market. Between 1983 and 1984, however, the in-house 
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TABLE FOUR 
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FEATURE FILMS LAUNCHED 
BY AMERICAN COMPANIES WORLDWIDE, 1981-1983 
Domestic Offshore Domestic Offshore Domestic Offsho~ 
Majors 81 18 3 7 28 57 35 
Indep~ndent s - 4 1 - 56 17 
-
46 
-
41 
-
38 
-
Total 122 7 4 54 74 98 73 
*I981 data are for 11 months of the year. 
Source: For 1981, Variety, December 8, 1982, p. 1 & 115. 
For 1982 and 1983, Variety, October 5 ,  1983, p. 1 & 34. 
Data for these years are for January - September of 
the year. 
Note that films completed in each year may be fewer than the 
actual number of films estimated to have gone before the cameras 
in this table. 
TABLE F I V E  
American majors' Releases: 
In-House vs. Outside Acquisitions 
Distribution Co. 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Buena Vista 
In-House 
Pickups & Affil. Cos. 
Total 
Columbia 
In-House 
Pickups 6 Affil. Cos. 
Total 
MGM-UA 
In-House 
Pickupa 6 Affil. Cos. 
Total 
Orion 
In-House 
Pickups & Affil. Cos. 
Total 
Paramount 
In-House 
Pickups 6 Mfil. Cos. 
Total 
20th Century-Fox 
In-House 
Pickups & Affil. Cos. 
Total 
Universal 
In-House 
Pickups 6 Affil. Cos. 
Total 
Warner Bros. 
In-House 
Pickups 6 Affil. Cos. 
Total 
Total majors In-House 
Pickupa 6 Affil. Cos. 
Total Releases 
In-House X 
majors' Classics Releases 
Grand Total of Releases 
Source: Variety. October 5. 1983. p. 35. 
1 73 
films released increased by 5%. If this becomes the dominant trend in 
the next five years, it would put the Canadian film producers, who need 
to have access to the U.S. theatrical markets, in serious jeopardy. 
It would be particularly difficult for producers who make mass 
market oriented pictures such as John Dunning, Harold Greenberg, and 
Claude Heroux, if their pictures were unwelcome to the American majors 
as U. S. theatrical market entry is crucial to recouping a substantial 
portion of their investments. Even an innovative producer like Denis 
Heroux needs the confidence generated by awards from we1 1-known inter- 
national film festivals to negotiate with the American majors to dis- 
tribute his films as in the case of Atlantic City. Although much 
euphoria exists about the big potential revenues from the ancillary 
markets for all, prices paid by the U.S. networks and pay-television 
companies depend to a large extent on a film's performance in the U.S. 
theatrical market. That market is still the core of the entertainment 
industry despite all the changes introduced by the new delivery systems 
such as pay-television and home-video cassettes. 
Recent reports in Variety suggest that the position of Canadian 
independents in the world markets may erode further particularly in the 
case of those who make formula films such as horror films. One article 
suggested that among the one hundred thirty films released by the 
major's in 1983, twenty-five percent of them received only a test 
release and they were all lower-budget films ranging in the area of  $ 9 
million or less (Variety, 2 November 1983, 37). Most major Canadian 
producers work with budgets around four million to six million dollars, 
if the trend suggested by this article holds, it may have serious 
implications for Canadian producers of feature film. 
The whole field of horror film production appears to be in turbu- 
lent times these days. This is important to Canada as it is one of the 
three most important suppliers of horror films to the U.S. market. The 
other two are U.S. and Britian. According to one report, although one 
hundred forty horror projects were publicly announced in 1982, only 
forty-five were actually shot in these three countries (Cohen, 1983, 7, 
24). If we consider the 1981 horror film production figures, they 
declined nearly fifty percent in 1982. As there is a time lag between 
production and release of at least two years (see Table One), many of 
these films would remain on the shelves of the distributors. This 
report suggests not only a glut in the market for horror pictures but 
also less willingness on the part of the majors to invest in distribut- 
ing them on a nation-wide basis. This does not bode well for many 
Canadian producers such as Harold Greenberg, John Dunning and Claude 
Heroux who have specialized in making such genre pictures. 
The majors' direct investment in financing pictures completely in 
Canada or elsewhere must be looked at with much caution. As John 
Dunning put it so well in the previous section, the Hollywood-style 
film the majors force on independent producers may not be beneficial at 
all to the independence of those f ilm-makers. Most of those films may 
not succeed in the box office arena and the little films which can be 
produced quite well with Canadian expertise and talent would be 
seriously canpromised to the needs and priorities of the American 
majors. It is a price that an independent producer may not be willing 
to pay. 
U.S. majors' involvement in film production in Canada necessarily 
results in Hollywood imitations being turned out by Canadians. That 
could have a devastating effect on Canada's historic attempt to build a 
national cinema. This thorny problem is well recognized in the follow- 
ing statement by Francis Fox, Canada's former Minister for Communica- 
tions: 
When Canadian producers and other key creators in film feel 
constrained to mold their productions into U.S. facsimiles 
because they are given to believe that unless they do this, 
the majors will not consider distributing them in Canada or 
elsewhere, this is appall ing . (Variety, 22 September 1983, 
3, 26) 
Economic entanglement with the U.S. majors appears to be a package deal 
for Canadians (and others) which might perpetuate Canada's cultural 
dependency on the United States contrary to Canada's long term policy 
goals. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study attempted to examine the pattern of economic relations 
between major Canadian film producers and major American producer- 
distributor canbines by analyzing the distribution deals for a selected 
number of Canadian pictures which were exhibited in the United States 
theatrical and other markets. It also analyzed the financing mechan- 
isms used by the Canadian producers in making their films, as well as 
the strategies they used in trying to maximize the revenues from the 
theatrical and ancillary markets. As major Canadian producers made 
their films with the intention of profiting fran the U.S. and other 
markets, we attempted to establish if they had succeeded or failed to 
achieve their goal, and under what specific conditions. We also at- 
tempted to establish how the Canadian producers benefitted by the 
expansion taking place in leisure industries in the U.S. and in Western 
Europe. 
As the sample consisted of eight major producers and ten films 
which had gained entry into the U.S. theatrical markets, findings in 
this study should not be generalized over the entire Canadian-American 
motion picture industry. It would be highly useful to Canadian policy- 
makers to conduct a study along the lines used in this research with an 
expanded sample of films and, thereby, include more Canadian producers. 
Equally important, marketing data for the films may be collected in the 
top ten markets of the U.S. to clearly understand how tte U.S. majors 
Practice their trade and under what contractual conditions their mar- 
keting strategies are beneficial to independent Canadian producers. 
The model for this part of the research could be drawn fran previous 
work on the distribution of Canadian films in the Chicago theatrical 
market (Pendakur , forthcoming ). 
It is widely recognized that the existing branch plant distribu- 
tionlexhibition in Canada is a hindrance to building a viable Canadian 
film industry and that U.S. distributors transfer their profits gener- 
ated in Canada to other countries (Variety, 22 September 1983, 3, 24).  
Several cabinet ministers in the past -- Hugh Falulkner, Jean Sauve, 
and Francis Fox -- have stated that those are the two principal prob- 
lems facing Canada's film industry. As those two issues are linked to 
Canada's cultural dependency problem in a crucial way, a reassessment 
of existing national policy is called for in order to address those 
problems. 
Conclusions 
1 .  For the sample of Canadian films in the study, profitability from 
the U. S. market is at best a mixed picture. Of the eight films fcr 
which we could obtain reliable data, five were not in a profit posi- 
tion, which meant their Canadian investors were still waiting for 
returns on their investment. It clearly indicates the high risk nature 
of the industry even when films are made to appeal to the American 
audience. 
2. When we compared the types of distribution deals -- the flat sale, 
profit deal, gross deal -- the gross deal was the most beneficial to 
the Canadian producers as it greatly minimized their risks. However, 
it was the most difficult one to obtain fran the American majors as it 
depends entirely on how badly they want a picture. 
3 .  Even when a Canadian producer secured a gross deal fran an Ameri- 
can major as Garth Drabinsky did for Tribute and Amateur, poor execu- 
tion in marketing those pictures reduced gross rentals. Consequently, 
those pictu'res remain unrecouped as far as their investors are con- 
cerned. 
4. In profit deal or net distribution deal, cross collateralization 
of revenues across various kinds cf markets (theatrical, anci 1 lary , 
etc .) and/or various territories (U.S., Canada, foreign) is beneficial 
to the U.S. distributors as it reduces their risks. But it 
substantially reduces the Canadian's producers share of rental 
revenues. Atlantic City and Scanners are such examples. Therefore, 
both pictures have remained unrecouped. 
5. The "best efforts" clause in a profit deal is hard to enforce. If 
there is a dispute between a producer and a distributor regarding the 
execution of a film's marketing, the resulting litigation jeopardizes 
the film. As the American major distributors are far more powerful and 
can afford to pay a battery of lawyers to defend them, reliance on the 
"best ef for ts"  clause for maximizing a producer's share of rental 
revenues i s  not a sound decision. 
6. Joint ventures o r  equity participation w i t h  the  American majors 
must be pursued with a l l  caution. They are at tractive to  producers 
because they not only bring i n  a portion of the  f i lm's  budget, but also 
guarantee U.S. distribution. However, the more money a producer de- 
mands upfront t o  make a f i lm, the more rights the distr ibutors take. 
Consequently, a picture that  has good box office potential may n o t  
yield a reasonable share t o  the producer. 
7. Joint  ventures f ran many sources, including conventional televi-  
sion, pay-cable, etc.  in the U.S., Canada as well as other countries 
spread the r i sk ,  thereby, strengthening the Canadian producers1 bar- 
gaining power with the U.S. majors. Joint ventures also assure a 
certain degree of market entry for those pictures i n  various markets 
around the world. I t  i s  uncertain whether creative control would 
effectively remain in Canadian hands in those cases. 
8. Complete financing obtained from the American majors to  make 
pictures in Canada bring in a package of problems. Not only do those 
films become unmanageable in s ize  and expectations but they also may 
not be profitable. 
9. The majors ' complete financing of "Canadian" pictures resul ts  in 
Canadian producers (and directors)  losing control of the creative 
decisions regarding the film. This process of passing on decision- 
making to Hollywcod and New York is  detrimental to developing a nation- 
al film industry in Canada. 
10. There appears t o  be a glut  in the low budget horror picture market 
worldwide. This means less opportunities for  Canadian-made horror 
pictures in the U.S. and other markets. 
11. U.S. market access for  pictures produced in Canada and thereby 
their  prof i tabi l i ty ,  r e s t  on. the  majors1 policy of acquiring suitable 
products around the world. If  that  policy is changed anytime in the 
future,  e.g., doing sore in-house productions as the 1983 - 1984 
figures indicate, Canada's producers wi 11 k seriously damaged. 
12. If market entry into the U.S. i s  the  cornerstone on which Canada's 
film industry i s  being bui l t ,  that  film industry i s  certainly on a 
shaky foundation. 
FOOTNOTE 
I could not have conducted t h i s  survey without the cooperation of the 
Canadian film producers whc shared the i r  experience and knowledge of 
the industry. Their assistance i s  deeply appreciated. I am also 
grateful to the Department of Coamunications, Government of Canada fo r  
supporting t h i s  work with a research grant. 
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